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DIMINISHED CAPACITY-EXPANDED DISCRETION:
SECTION 5K2.13 OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND THE DEMISE OF THE "NON-VIOLENT OFFENSE"
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Anglo-American tradition, courts have developed a rich history
of taking the mental status of the offender into account when determining
criminal responsibility and the appropriate sentence.' Since the advent of
the Sentencing Reform Act,2 the United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission") has continued this tradition by providing for a downward
departure from mandatory sentencing-that is, reducing the defendant's
sentence-by taking into account diminished mental capacity and the na-
ture of the offense.3 Exemplified by section 5K2.13 of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), this policy provides for downward
departure when the defendant has a diminished mental capacity and has
committed an offense without using actual or threatened violence.
4
1. See generally Ren6 J. Leblanc-Allman, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Poor Prognosis,
49 S.C. L. REv. 1095 (1998) (discussing guilty but mentally ill pleas); Richard Low-
ell Nygaard, On Responsibility: Or, The Insanity of Mental Defenses and Punishment, 41
VILL. L. REV. 951 (1996) (discussing insanity defense in context of individual dif-
ferences); Michael L. Perin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental
Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 Am. J. CRIM. L. 431 (1995) (discuss-
ing mental disability and Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. & 28 U.S.C. (1984)).
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (1997) (describing
grounds for departure). In general, and for the purpose of this Comment, down-
ward departure means that a judge may depart from the prescribed mandatory
ranges of the Guidelines and assign a sentence below the mandatory minimum.
See id. (discussing factors involved in downward departure); see also Perin & Gould,
supra note 1, at 432-33 (discussing departure and emotional conditions). The
Guidelines describe departures as follows:
The sentencing statute permits a court to depart from a guideline-speci-
fied sentence only when it finds an "aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4) (b) (1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (1995)).
4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1997) (establishing ele-
ments of downward departure). Prior to the 1998 amendment to the Guidelines,
section 5K2.13 provided:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from
significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of
drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect
the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commis-
sion of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does
not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.
(679)
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During the past decade the definition and application of "non-violent
offense" under section 5K2.13 has been a topic of vigorous debate, result-
ing in a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals. 5 Because of this
circuit split, the Commission revamped section 5K2.13. Before amending
the Guidelines, the majority of circuits concluded that the language found
in section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines controlled the meaning of the phrase
"non-violent offense."'6 Section 4B1.2, however, does not contain a defini-
tion of non-violent offense. Instead, it delineates what constitutes a "crime
of violence" under the career offender provisions of the Guidelines.7
Before the amendment to section 5K2.13, the majority of circuits found
the phrase "non-violent offense" to mean the opposite of the term "crime
of violence."" A significant minority of circuits, however, had held that the
phrase "non-violent offense" was not controlled by the "crime of violence"
language located in section 4B1.2.9
Moreover, the circuits also disagreed over whether a sentencing court
should exercise its discretion and consider the facts and circumstances of
each case in determining what constituted a non-violent offense, or should
subvertjudicial discretion to the prescribed statutory elements and defini-
tions of the Guidelines.10
Reacting to this significant disagreement among the circuit courts of
appeals, the Commission reformulated the language and applicability of
section 5K2.13.11 The Commission's decision to completely rewrite the
5. Id. Compare United States v. Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding "crime of violence" definition controlling on phrase "non-violent of-
fense"), United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-93 (7th Cir. 1991) (same),. United
States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989) (same), and United States v.
Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989) (same); with United States v. Wed-
die, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding "crime of violence" language not
controlling on phrase "non-violent offense"), and United States v. Chatman, 986
F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same).
6. SeeJeremy D. Feinstein, Note, Are Threats Always "Violent" Crimes?, 94 MicH.
L. REv. 1067, 1067-68 (1996) (discussing meaning of violent offense). Whether or
not a crime is characterized as violent under section 512.13 is significant in two
ways. First, if a crime is considered non-violent and the defendant suffers from
diminished mental capacity, he or she may be entitled to sentence reduction. See
id. at 1068 (discussing first prong of section 5K2.13). Second, if the crime is classi-
fied as violent and the defendant falls under the career offender provisions of the
Guidelines, he or she may receive a more severe sentence. See id. (characterizing
distinction between two phrases as difficult).
7. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2000) (defining "crime
of violence"). Section 4B1.2 states that a crime of violence "has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of an-
other .... Id.
8. See, e.g., Poff 926 F.2d at 591-93 (asserting majority position).
9. See Weddle, 30 F.3d at 540 (asserting minority view and discussing dissent in
Pof) .
10. See United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 544-46 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting
that surrounding circumstances test allows court to exercise its discretion).
11. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2000) (describing de-
parture for diminished mental capacity). See generally United States v. Koltun, No.
[Vol. 46: p. 679
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language of section 5K2.13 was due, at least in part, to the Third Circuit's
decision in United States v. Askari12 and its comprehensive analysis of sec-
tion 5K2.13 jurisprudence.' 3
This Comment focuses upon the historical and jurisprudential foun-
dations of downward departures for diminished mental capacity under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.1 4 Part II examines section 5K2.13 of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines as written prior to 1998.15 Moreover, Part
II delineates the considerable disagreement among the federal circuit
courts of appeals that occurred prior to the Commission amending section
5K2.13.16 Part III discusses the Third Circuit's decision in Askari and its
contribution to section 5K2.13 jurisprudence. 17 Part IV focuses upon the
new language of section 5K2.13 and its current application to offenders
who suffer from diminished mental capacity.1 8 Finally, Part V discusses
the potential impact of the new language of section 5K2.13 upon the vari-
ous circuit courts of appeal. 19
00-1348, 2000 WL 1737809 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2000) (discussing post-amendment
section 5K2.13 application); United States v. Storti, No. 99-1638, 2000 WL 1529799
(6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2000) (noting that pre-amendment section 5K2.13 language is
applicable to cases prior to 1998); United States v. Timbana, 222 F.3d 688 (9th Cir.
2000) (pointing to newly amended section 5K2.13 language and applicability);
United States v. Sharp, 217 F.3d 842, No. 99-4736, 2000 WL 962484 (4th Cir. July
12, 2000) (discussing new language of 5K2.13); United States v. Dyer, 216 F.3d 568
(7th Cir. 2000) (discussing language of section 5K2.13); United States v. Thames,
214 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing to new phraseology of section 5K2.13); United
States v. Tayloe, No. 99-30083, 2000 WL 234832 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000) (applying
pre-1998 version of section 5K2.13).
12. 140 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 1998).
13. See id. at 547 (accepting minority view but taking different view of appro-
priate standard).
14. For a discussion of the history and application of diminished mental ca-
pacity jurisprudence under section 5K2.13, see infra notes 20-76 and accompany-
ing text.
15. For a discussion of pre-amendment section 5K2.13 language, see infra
notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the circuit split regarding section 5K2.13's application,
see infra notes 40-76 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the facts and analysis of the Third Circuit's decision in
Askari, see infra notes 77-121 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the new language of section 5K2.13 and its current
application, see infra notes 122-60 and accompanying text
19. For an analysis of future section 5K2.13jurisprudence, see infra notes 142-
60 and accompanying text.
20011
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II. BACKGROUND: DOwNwARD DEPARTURE FOR DIMINISHED CAPACITY
UNDER THE PRE-1998 GUIDELINES
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
In 1975, legislation was introduced in the 94th Congress establishing
the United States Sentencing Commission. 20 Reacting to a perceived dis-
satisfaction with the disparity in federal sentencing discretion, Congress
enacted legislation to combat this purported trend.2 1 In 1984, both
houses of Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act 2 2 as part of the
20. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 223 (1993)
(discussing origins of Sentencing Commission). Senator Edward M. Kennedy in-
troduced the original legislation. See id. In 1974, the Yale Law Journal conducted a
seminar on sentencing and parole reform. See id. at 229 (discussing journal's at-
tempt to develop scientific method of sentencing for federal courts). This attempt
produced the parole guideline table which would later become the Sentencing
Guidelines. See id. In 1975, the Yale sentencing seminar completed its proposal
for eliminating sentencing disparity in the federal system. See id. at 230. Later that
year, the final draft of the Yale project became the basis for the legislation pro-
posed by Senator Kennedy. See id.
21. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing:
The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 95
(1999) (noting that "vast discretion was the hallmark of federal sentencing" for
over seventy-five percent of twentieth century); Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 226-
27 (discussing issue of disparity in sentencing). Traditionally, judges in the federal
system enjoyed a substantial amount of discretion in sentencing issues. See id. at
225 (noting that before sentencing guidelines, federal criminal statutes stated only
maximum terms). Additionally, there existed no appellate review mechanism of a
federal judge's sentencing discretion. See id. at 226 (noting that lack of appellate
review lasted for over two-hundred years). In 1910, the introduction of the parole
system marked one of the first controls over judicial determination of sentencing.
See id. (indicating that parole officers and not the judiciary made these decisions).
With the beginnings of federal parole, prison terms became partially indetermi-
nate. See id. at 226-27 (noting that court's sentence effectively determined only
minimum term). The rehabilitative model brought about the advent of indetermi-
nacy and parole. See id. at 227 (noting that rehabilitation justified early release
from prison).
One of the most influential critics of the federal sentencing system was a for-
mer federal district judge named Marvin E. Frankel. See id. at 228. Frankel charac-
terized the federal sentencing power as "almost wholly unchecked and sweeping
... terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of
law." d. (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER
5 (1972)). Frankel was the catalyst for a movement that sought to eliminate the
indeterminate rehabilitative parole system. See id. at 229-30. The Sentencing Com-
mission itself acknowledged sentencing disparity in the pre-Guideline era:
The region in which the defendant is convicted is likely to change the
length of time served from approximately six months more if one is sen-
tenced in the South to twelve months less if one is sentenced in central
California .... [B]lack [bank robbery] defendants convicted . . . in the
South are likely to actually serve approximately thirteen months longer
than similarly situated bank robbers convicted . . . in other regions.
22. Bruce M. Selya & Mathew R. Kipp, An Examination of EmergingJurisprudence
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (quoting
Hearings on Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 554, 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Commissioner
[Vol. 46: p. 679
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Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.23 The Act empowered the
Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines that are binding on the
federal district courts.
24
Operating the Guidelines is a relatively straightforward process.
2 5
The Guidelines mandate a sentencing range at the intersection of an of-
fense level and criminal history category.26 Absent meaningful and unu-
sual circumstances, a defendant must be sentenced within the appropriate
Ilene H. Nagel)); see also William Rhodes, Federal Criminal Sentencing: Some Measure-
ment Issues with Application to Pre-Guideline Sentencing Disparity, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1002, 1009-11 (1991) (finding that southern courts imposed stricter
sentences than western courts).
For a further discussion of criticisms of the pre-Guideline process, see gener-
ally S. REP. No. 98-225, at 37-50 (1984); AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971); THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISH-
MENT (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976).
23. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C. (1984)).
24. See Gerald R. Smith, An Introductory Tour Through the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and Sentencing Procedures, ILL. INST. FOR CONTINUING L. EDUC. 11.1 (1997)
(discussing establishment of Sentencing Commission). The Guidelines contain
three different types of language: guideline provisions, policy statements and com-
mentary. See United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing
three textual components of Guidelines). Sentences under the Guidelines are
based on the appropriate sentencing category and the Commission's policy state-
ments and commentary. See United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir.
1995) (citing United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1404-05 (3d Cir. 1994)). The
Supreme Court has held that "[t]he principle that the Guidelines Manual is bind-
ing on the federal courts applies as well to policy statements." Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993). Moreover, where "a policy statement prohibits a
district court from taking a specified action, the statement is an authoritative guide
to the meaning of the applicable guideline." Corrado, 53 F.3d at 624 (citing Wil-
liams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992); and United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d
1396, 1424 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994)).
25. See Selya & Kipp, supra note 21, at 6-8 (discussing operation of Guide-
lines). The central aspect of the Guidelines is the sentencing grid that contains
forty-three offense levels and six criminal history categories. See id. at 6. The cate-
gories are cross-referenced on an X, Y axis system. See id.
26. See id. (discussing steps involved in sentencing process). Despite the ap-
parent simplicity of the Guidelines, there are numerous steps involved in its appli-
cation to any given offender. See id. The sentencing judge first determines the
appropriate statute of conviction and assigns a base offense level. See id. Second,
the judge determines whether adjustments to the base offense level are warranted.
See id. at 7. Adjustments to the base level are governed by five factors: the victim's
characteristics; the defendant's role in the offense; whether the defendant ob-
structed justice; the incidence of multiple counts; and whether the defendant ac-
cepted responsibility for his actions. See id. Third, the judge calculates the
defendant's criminal history category. See id. (noting that points are assigned
based on offender's past conviction record). After consulting the sentencing grid
to determine the appropriate sentencing range, the court then must consider a
number of factors prescribed by Congress. See id. The factors prescribed by Con-
gress include: the seriousness of the offense; deterrence; public protection; the
indicated sentence under the Guidelines; policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission; and avoidance of unwarranted disparities in sentencing. See id. If the
5
Miller: Diminished Capacity - Expanded Discretion: Section 5K2.13 of the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
684 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46: p. 679
sentencing range.27 Nevertheless, the Guidelines do allow a judge to de-
part from the Guideline-imposed sentence if there are reasons justifying
the departure and if the decision is subject to appellate review. 28 Appel-
late courts generally affirm departures from the Guidelines only if the de-
partures are reasonable.
29
interim calculations are performed correctly, imposition of a sentence within the
sentencing range may not be reviewed.on appeal. See id.
27. See id. at 6 (noting interaction between categories); see also Steven E. Zip-
perstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate RLeuiew and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 621, 621-23 (1992) (noting that before 1987, federal appellate courts
played virtually no role in criminal sentencing process). Appellate review is pro-
vided in 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and describes the circumstances under which an appeal
may be brought. See id. at 629 (providing appealability of four different types of
sentencing decisions). Both sides of the adversarial process may appeal sentences
imposed in violation of law, sentences imposed as a result of incorrect application
of the Guidelines, departures and unreasonable sentences. See id. at 629-30 (dis-
cussing factors appellate court should consider during review). The statute does
not provide jurisdiction for appeals from sentences as a result of correct applica-
tion of the Guidelines or from bargains under Rule 11 (e) (1) (C) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id. at 632 (discussing scope of jurisdiction).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2000) (mandating that judges justify departures
from Guidelines). Section 3553(c) provides:
(c) Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence. -The court, at the
time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition
of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence-
(]) is of the kind, and within the range, described in subsection
(a) (4) and that range exceeds 24 months, the reason for imposing a
sentence at a particular point within the range; or
(2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in subsec-
tion (a) (4), the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence dif-
ferent from that described.
Id.; see also Kirk D. Houser, Comment, Downward Departures: The Lower Envelope of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 361, 367-69 (1993) (discussing appel-
late review under Guidelines).
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(e) (3) & (f) (2) (2000) (setting standard of review);
see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1988) (stating that judge can
depart from Guidelines subject to appellate review under reasonableness stan-
dard). Section 5K2.0 of the guidelines indicates that according to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (1998), a sentencing court may grant a departure from the Guidelines
in the presence of "aggravating or mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2000). In essence, the
Commission gave the courts the ability to consider factors in addition to those
identified in the Guidelines that have not been given appropriate consideration by
the Commission. See id. (indicating that Commission did not consider all possible
factors involved). Decisions of this type are left to the discretion of the sentencing
court. See id.
6
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B. Downward Departure for Diminished Mental Capacity Under Section
5K2.13 of the Guidelines
1. Pre-Amendment Language
Prior to the 1998 Amendments to the Guidelines, section 5K2.13 al-
lowed a sentencing court to grant a departure below the sentencing range
prescribed.
[For] a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly re-
duced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs
or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to re-
flect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to
the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's
criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to
protect the public. 3 °
The Commission did not provide a definition of non-violent offense in the
Guidelines, and courts were inconsistent in its application. 3 1 Although
the language "non-violent offense" was not defined in either section
5K2.13 or the commentary accompanying the Guidelines, section 5K2.13
excluded numerous categories of offenses from downward departure.
32
Additionally, courts rarely granted departures from the Guidelines based
upon diminished capacity under section 5K2.13. 33
30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1997).
31. See Seth A. Travis, Comment, Guiding the Sentencing Court's Discretion: A
Proposed Definition of the Phrase "Non-Violent Offense" Under United States Sentencing
Guideline § 5K2.13, 86J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 530, 531 (1996) (noting Commis-
sion's failure to define non-violent offense).
32. See id. (lacking definition of "non-violent offense"); see also United States v.
Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 540 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting failure to define non-violent of-
fense in section 5K2.13 or accompanying commentary). Although the term "non-
violent offense" was not specifically defined in section 5K2.13, courts identified
offenses that fell in the violent category. See, e.g., United States v. Premachandra,
32 F.3d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding armed robbery with pellet gun violent
offense); United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1327 (l1th Cir. 1994) (holding
threatening communications qualifies as violent offense); United States v. Mad-
dalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding armed robbery qualifies as
violent offense); see also, e.g., Andrew M. Campbell, Downward Departure Under
§ 5K2.13 of United States Sentencing Guidelines (18 U.S. C.A. Appx) Permitting Downward
Departure for Defendants with Significantly Reduced Mental Capacity Convicted of Nonvio-
lent Offenses, 128 A.L.R. FED. 593, § 19(b) (1995) (noting numerous cases in which
section 5K2.13 did not apply). These cases included those in which the reduced
mental capacity was a result of voluntary substance abuse. See id. (citing United
States v. Hunter, 980 F. Supp. 1439 (M.D. Ala. 1997)).
33. See generally United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing severe adjustment disorder not sufficient for downward departure); United
States v. Webb, 49 F.3d 636 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding paranoia not sufficient for
downward departure); United States v. Morrison, 46 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding depression not sufficient for departure); United States v. Christensen, 18
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding bipolar disorder not sufficient for departure);
United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding isolated delusion not
sufficient for downward departure); United States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523 (D.C.
2001]
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Although the language of pre-amendment section 5K2.13 did not de-
fine the term "non-violent offense," the career offender provisions of the
Guidelines defined the phrase "crime of violence."3 4 Under the Guide-
lines, section 4B1.1 35 defines "career offender," whereas section 4B1.2
provides,definitions for the terms found in section 4B1.1, including "crime
of violence." 36 The definition located in section 4B1.2 specifies the term
of imprisonment and delineates the statutory elements involved in a crime
of violence. 37 The application notes of section 4B1.2 expand on the defi-
Cir. 1992) (holding personality disorder not sufficient for downward departure);
United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding compulsive gam-
bling not sufficient for downward departure); United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d
326 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding mental retardation not sufficient for downward depar-
ture); United States v. Davis, 919 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding panic disor-
der not sufficient for downward departure).
34. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (1998) (defining career
offenders and criminal livelihood).
35. Id. The relevant language states:
§ 4B1.1. Career Offender
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the in-
stant offense of conviction, (2) the instant offense of conviction
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled sub-
stance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior fel-
ony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.
Id.; see also Smith, supra note 24, at 11.39 (discussing career offender provisions).
36. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 (2000).
37. See id. The relevant language of section 4B1.2 states:
(a) The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or
state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that-
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explo-
sives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another.
(b) The term "controlled substance offense" means an offense under
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or
dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with in-
tent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.
(c) The term "two prior felony convictions" means (1) the defendant
committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at
least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense (i.e., two felony convictions of a crime of violence, two
felony convictions of a controlled substance offense, or one felony convic-
tion of a crime of violence and one felony conviction of a controlled sub-
stance offense), and (2) the sentences for at least two of the
aforementioned felony convictions are counted separately under the pro-
visions of § 4Al.1 (a), (b), or (c). The date that a defendant sustained a
conviction shall be the date that the guilt of the defendant has been es-
tablished, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere.
Id. (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 46: p. 679686
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nition with specific examples.3 8 Nevertheless, the interpretation of pre-
amendment section 5K2.13 and section 4B1.2 produced considerable dis-
sention among circuit courts of appeals.
3 9
2. Pre-Amendment Circuit Split
Prior to the total revamping of the diminished capacity provision of
the Guidelines, the issue among the circuit courts was whether the phrase
"non-violent offense" contained in section 5K2.13 was defined by refer-
ence to section 4B1.2's "crime of violence" definition. 40 A majority of cir-
cuits, including the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth,
4 1
38. See id. The application notes elaborate:
1. For purposes of this guideline-
"Crime of violence" and "controlled substance offense" include the of-
fenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit
such offenses.
"Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, ag-
gravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extor-
tionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses
are included as "crimes of violence" if (A) that offense has as an ele-
ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i.e., ex-
pressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted
involved use of explosives (including any explosive material or destruc-
tive device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physi-
cal injury to another.
Id.
39. See Travis, supra note 31, at 531 (noting that inquiries have produced cir-
cuit split). Compare United States v. Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996) (ap-
plying section 4B1.2 definition to section 5K2.13), United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d
1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 1994) (same), United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1513
(9th Cir. 1993) (same), United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1991)
(same), and United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989) (same),
with United States v. Morin, 124 F.3d 649,.653 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding section
4B1.2 is inapplicable to section 5K2.13), United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540
(4th Cir. 1994) (same), and United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (same).
40. See United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 543 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting vari-
ous circuit courts have answered this question differently).
41. See generally United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding inability to speak English not sufficient for downward departure); United
States v. Epley, 52 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding lack of causation of mental
disorder and commission of offense); United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding severe adjustment disorder not sufficient for downward depar-
ture); United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding no causa-
tion with compulsive gambling disorder); United States v. Wilson, 920 F.2d 1290
(6th Cir. 1990) (holding that plotting for murder is not non-violent offense);
United States v. Davis, 919 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying downward depar-
ture for panic disorder).
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Seventh, 42 Eighth, 43 Ninth44 and Eleventh 45 Circuits, concluded that the
definition of non-violent offense found in pre-amendment section 5K2.13
meant the opposite of the crime of violence definition found in sec-
tion 4B1.2.46 A minority of circuits, including the United States Courts
of Appeals for the Third, 47 Fourth48 and District of Columbia Cir-
42. See generally United States v. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding unusually low intelligence quotient not sufficient for downward depar-
ture); United States vJohnson, 999 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming decision
denying departure for schizophrenia); United States v. Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding depression not sufficient to warrant downward departure);
United States v. Gentry, 925 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding general emotional
problems insufficient for downward departure).
43. See generally United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding
post-traumatic stress disorder sufficient for downward departure); United States v.
Jackson, 56 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding no downward departure for unspeci-
fied emotional problems); United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding bank robbery qualifies as violent offense); United States v. Dillard,
975 F.2d 1554 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying downward departure for paranoid schizo-
phrenia); United States v. Schneider, 948 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir. 1991) (denying
downward departure for coercion of overbearing wife); United States v. Ruklick,
919 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding schizo-affective disorder sufficient for down-
ward departure).
44. See generally United States v. Cook, 53 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
unarmed bank robbery qualifies as violent offense); United States v. Christensen,
18 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding manic-depression not sufficient for down-
ward departure); United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1993)
(granting departure under section 5K2.13); United States v. Lewison, 988 F.2d
1005 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing departure for unspecified emotional problems);
United States v. Anders, 956 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that voluntary in-
toxication is not basis for downward departure); United States v. Fairless, 975 F.2d
664 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding single act of aberrant behavior sufficient for depar-
ture); United States v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding no depar-
ture for unarmed bank robbery).
45. See generally United States v. Holden, 61 F.3d 858 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
no causation between mental condition and offense); United States v. Chigbo, 38
F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding no causation between crime and mental sta-
tus); United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding kidnapping
violent crime); United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that
paranoia reduced defendant's volitional abilities); United States v. Munoz-Realpe,
21 F.3d 375 (1th Cir. 1994) (reversing district court's grant of downward depar-
ture); United States v. Patterson, 15 F.3d 169 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding no causa-
tion between mental condition and commission of offense); United States v.
Russell, 917 F.2d 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding diminished capacity in dependent
personality disorder).
46. See Travis, supra note 31, at 531 (noting that any crime defined as violent
under section 4B1.2 is not non-violent offense).
47. See generally United States v. Bissell, 954 F. Supp. 841 (D.NJ. 1996) (hold-
ing that personality disorder not sufficient for downward departure); United States
v. Sewards, 879 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding no departure for voluntary
substance abuse); Venezia v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 919 (D.NJ. 1995) (deny-
ing departure based on compulsive gambling disorder); United States v. Reaves,
811 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting insufficient causation for downward
departure).
48. See generally United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding
no downward departure for voluntary drug use); United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d
688
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cuits49 concluded that the majority approach was devoid of any support in
the policy statements and text of sections 5K2.13 and 4B1.2. 50 Accord-
ingly, this minority position had adopted a "fact specific inquiry to deter-
mine whether the underlying conduct was indeed nonviolent." 5' Even
though five circuit courts comprised the pre-amendment majority ap-
proach to the issue, only the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in United States v. PofJf2 provided a detailed and
elaborate analysis of their position and reasoning.
53
a. The Majority Position
After initially focusing on the text of the Guidelines, the Poff majority
acknowledged that the Commission did not define the phrase "non-vio-
lent offense" in section 5K2.13. 54 The Poff court found that, in general, a
1142 (4th Cir. 1996) (denying departure based on claim of severe depression);
United States v. Goossens, 84 F.3d 697 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding anxiety disorder
not sufficient for downward departure); United States v. Ghannam, 899 F.2d 327
(4th Cir. 1990) (holding depression not sufficient for downward departure);
United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding district court cor-
rectly denied departure).
49. See generally United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing no downward departure for voluntary intoxication); United States v. Edwards,
98 F.3d 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding introversion insufficient for downward de-
parture); United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying de-
parture for battered spouse syndrome); United States v. Johnson, 49 F.3d 766
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding no causation between mental status and commission of
offense); United States v. Watley, 987 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding border-
line intelligence not sufficient for downward departure); United States v. Perkins,
963 F.2d 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's grant of downward depar-
ture); United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding unarmed
robbery qualifies as violent offense); United States v. Adonis, 891 F.2d 300 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (holding intent to distribute qualifies as non-violent offense).
50. See Travis, supra note 31, at 531-32 (discussing leniency policy behind sec-
tion 5K2.13); see also Daniel Wise, Retarded Man's Sentence Is Cut, Under Fed'l Guide-
lines Factors, N.Y. L.J., July 10, 1997, at 1 (noting that Guideline standards applied
unfairly to mentally retarded individual manipulated by co-defendant).
51. Travis, supra note 31, at 532.
52. 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
53. See Travis, supra note 31, at 537-38 (discussing majority view). The major-
ity defines the phrase non-violent offense narrowly. See id. at 537-39 (expressing
view that definition of crime of violence controls departure under section 5K2.13).
In Poff, the appellant had a mental health history as well as a history of making
threats. See Poff 926 F.2d at 589-90. She was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 871
(1982) for writing threatening letters to then-President Ronald Regan. See id. at
590. Appellant raised an insanity defense at her trial. See id. Once convicted, her
past criminal record mandated that she receive her sentence pursuant to the ca-
reer offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. The appellant con-
tended that the career offender provisions did not apply because she never
intended to carry out her threats. See id. The court dismissed this argument not-
ing that "threats ... themselves [are] a form of violence." See id. (citing Rogers v.
United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
54. See Poff, 926 F.2d at 591 (noting failure to define non-violent offense in
section 5K2.13). The appellant in Poff contended that this omission indicated that
the Commission meant for the terms "non-violent" and "crime of violence" to con-
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choice of different words in statutory language usually reflects an intent to
convey a different meaning.5 5 Rather than focusing on the lack of a defi-
nition, the Poff court instead chose to concentrate on the fact that the
Commission utilized the same root word for both phrases-violence.
56
Based upon this similarity, the Seventh Circuit in Poff reasoned that as the
"root and meaning" in both phrases were the same, it would be inappro-
priate to allocate different meanings to the same word or phrase when
used on multiple occasions within the Guidelines. 57 Specifically, the court
stated that the Guidelines should be read as a whole and, "when the same
word appears in different, though related sections, that word likely bears
the same meaning in both instances."
5 8
The Poff court next turned to the Armed Career Offender provision
of 18 U.S.C § 924, as it existed in 1990, to further support its finding that
linguistic differences between the phrases were insignificant.59 Specifi-
cally, the Poff majority turned to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) (i), which de-
fines the term "violent felony" to "include any crime that, has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another. ' 60 In doing so, the court noted that this
definition was consistent with the crime of violence found in section 4B1.2
of the Guidelines.
6 1
The Poff majority reasoned that because there is no difference be-
tween a violent offense and a crime of violence, it is impossible to derive a
distinction between a violent felony and a violent offense. 62 In further
support of its position, the Poff court asserted that if the Commission had
intended the phrases in section 5K2.13 and section 4B1.2 to convey differ-
vey different meanings. See id. The Poff court did acknowledge that "[clourts
often say that the choice of different words reflects an intent to say something
different." Id. (citing Zabielski v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 919 F.2d 1276, 1279 (7th
Cir. 1990), for proposition that use of different words denotes intent to have differ-
ent meaning).
55. See Poff 926 F.2d at 591 (acknowledging difficulty in discerning meaning
of ambiguous phrases).
56. See id. (discussing construction of phrases). The Poff court acknowledged
that in one instance the Commission used the word "violence" with the negative
construction "non," and in the other case used it as a prepositional phrase. See id.
57. See id. Based on this analysis, the Poff majority stated that "a rather heavy
load rests on him who would give different meanings to the same word or the same
phrase when used a plurality of times in the same Act ...." Id. (quoting United
States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F.2d 369, 377 (7th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 326 U.S.
690 (1945)). The Poff majority also noted that this burden could not be met by
"teas[ing] meaning from the Commission's use of a prepositional phrase rather
than an adjective." Id.
58. Id. (citing Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 228 (7th Cir. 1990), for
proposition that Guidelines should be read as a whole).
59. See id. at 592.
60. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (B) (i) (1996)).
61. See id. (noting similarity in language between violent felony, violent of-
fense and crime of violence).
62. See id.
[Vol. 46: p. 679
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ent meanings, it would have expressly done so. 63 To support its conclu-
sion, the Poff majority noted that other courts considering the issue
concluded that the two phrases found in section 5K2.13 and section 4B1.2
are mutually exclusive. 64 While the majority in Poff held that the language
in section 4B1.2 was controlling on section 5K2.13, a powerful dissent pro-
vided the rationale and foundation for strong opinions by a growing num-
ber of circuit courts.
6 5
b. The Minority Position
The opinion of the minority of circuits, best articulated by the United
States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United
63. See id. (discussing intent of Sentencing Commission). The court believed
that the Commission could have offered different definitions for each term. See id.
Similarly, the court noted that a simple cross-reference between sections would
have eliminated the current confusion. See id. (noting that Sentencing Commis-
sion could not have foreseen this difficulty). Moreover, the court noted that the
.natural reading" of the two terms suggests that they are "contrapositive." See id.
(noting laypersons understanding of terms). Therefore, "the omission of a sepa-
rate definition, or a cross-reference, is only surprising if the Commission intended
the terms to overlap." Id. The Poff court also acknowledged that its position did
not "rely solely on the common root of the terms in question." Id. Specifically, the
Poff court noted that the Commission "chose to define threats as crimes of violence
in the Career Offender provision of the Guidelines." Id. Discussing the Guide-
lines, the court noted that the Guidelines permit career offenders or other histori-
cally violent defendants to receive increased sentences to deter future violent
behavior. See id. The Poff court also noted that section 5K2.13 limits the authority
of courts to grant a downward departure to defendants with diminished mental
capacity when "the defendant's criminal history... does not indicate a need for
incarceration to protect the public." Id. Accordingly, even if the terms were not
mutually exclusive, the departure still would not have been granted based on the
defendant's past criminal history. See id. (noting that to hold otherwise would re-
sult in inconsistent interpretation of Guidelines).
64. See id. (noting that "[e]very court that has considered the interplay be-
tween § 4B1.2 and § 5K2.13 has held that the terms are mutually exclusive .... );
see, e.g., United States v. Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 517 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting terms
"non-violent offense" and "crime of violence" are mutually exclusive); United
States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Rosen,
896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990) (same), overruled by United States v. Askari, 140
F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir.
1989) (same); United States v. Speight, 726 F. Supp. 861, 865-66 (D.D.C. 1989)
(same). The Poff majority also indicated that even if the Commission had in-
tended to define violence differently in section 5K2.13, the court would be forced
to guess at a meaning. See Poff 926 F.2d at 592-93.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 546 (3d Cir. 1998) (abrogat-
ing Rosen); United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 539 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting Poff
analysis and noting that "Poff dissent [has] the better argument"); United States v.
Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (rejecting Government's argument
that section 4B1.2 governs section 5K2.13).
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States v. Chatman,6 6 the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Weddle6 7 and the
dissenting opinion in Poff began their analysis of pre-amendment section
5K2.13 by focusing on its plain language. 6  First, these opinions noted
that the Guidelines lacked express language suggesting that the "crime of
violence" definition of section 4B1.2 controlled the "non-violent offense"
language of section 5K2.13.69 Indeed, the opinions by the Chatman court
as well as the dissent in Poff noted that the lack of cross-referencing be-
tween sections 5K2.13 and 4B1.2 was especially telling because the Guide-
lines are, in general, thoroughly cross-referenced.
7t0
66. 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In Chatman, the defendant pled guilty to
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and then appealed his sentence
of thirty-seven months of incarceration. See id. at 1447-48. The defendant ap-
pealed his sentence pursuant to section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines, claiming dimin-
ished mental capacity and the commission of a non-violent offense. See id. at 1448.
Because the defendant used a threatening note during the commission of the of-
fense, the district court refused to grant a departure under section 5K2.13. See id.
(citing district court's reason for refusing downward departure). Noting that the
district court underestimated its discretion, the court of appeals remanded the
case to the district court for resentencing. See id.
67. 30 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 1994). In Weddle, the defendant pled guilty to mail-
ing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. See Weddle, 30
F.3d at 534. In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated that no departures ap-
plied to the case. See id. at 535. The defendant's probation officer suggested
downward departure for diminished capacity under section 5K2.13 if the court
found that the act in question was a non-violent offense. See id.
68. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1447 (discussing text and application of section
5K2.13's plain language); Weddle, 30 F.3d at 537-38 (noting plain language of sec-
tion 5K2.13's text); Poff 926 F.2d at 594-95 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (finding
language of section 5K2.13 instructive); see also Berman, supra note 21, at 103 (not-
ing that plain language of Guidelines is often "vague"). According to Professor
Berman, the vague language itself is one of many ways a federal judge may assert a
judicial role in the determination of sentences. See id. (noting that Guidelines
require judges to make crucial judgments about range and applicability of
sentences even after Sentencing Reform Act).
69. See Poff 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook
noted:
It would have been easy to write § 5K2.13 to say that thejudge may depart
unless the defendant committed a "crime of violence" as § 4B1.2 defines
it; instead the Commission selected different formulations. Although it
laid out a detailed meaning for "crime of violence" in § 4B1.2, it did not
provide so much as a cross-reference in § 5K2.13, a curious omission if
the Commission meant to link these phrases so tightly that they are mutu-
ally exclusive.
Id.; see also Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 (noting lack of express language). Noting
that some courts have relied on section 4B1.2, the court in Chatman stated, "Noth-
ing in the Guidelines themselves or in the Application Notes suggests that section
4B1.2 is meant to control the interpretation and application of section 5K2.13."
Id.
70. See Poff 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting lack of cross-
references). The dissent in Poff noted that although "[clourts often say that differ-
ent language in different places conveys different meanings," this approach often
overstates the precision exercised by legislators. Id. (citing Pittston Coal Group v.
Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988)); see also United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 56
(2d Cir. 1987) (showing that different language can convey different meaning);
692 [Vol. 46: p. 679
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These courts also indicated that the common -root shared by the
phrases "crime of violence" and "non-violent offense" may not necessarily
denote polar opposites.7 ' The dissent in Poff took great care to painstak-
ingly indicate that the Commission sought to establish in section 4B1.2
that the determination of "whether a crime is one 'of violence' depends
on its elements and not on the defendant's conduct, so that an unrealized
prospect of violence makes the crime one of violence." 72 The dissent in
Poffnoted that it took a detailed definition to make an unrealized prospect
of violence a crime of violence. 73 Additionally, the Poff dissent deter-
mined that the appropriate interpretation was to read the language of sec-
tion 5K2.13 without tying it to the "term of art" found in section 4B1.2.74
Tafoya v. Dept. of Justice, 748 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1984) (same). The
Poff dissent also noted that the Guidelines and accompanying commentary were
written with great attention to relation among sections. See id. (citing United States
v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989)). Similarly, the court in Chatman noted
that, despite the fact that the Commission amended section 4B1.2 and its commen-
tary twice between 1991 and 1993, the revised section 4B1.2 never linked or refer-
enced section 5K2.13. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at 253-54, 284-85 (1992) to show Commission had
opportunity to link section 4B1.2 with section 5K2.13).
71. See Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that phrases
may take meanings other than opposites).
72. See id. (citing Taylorv. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 585 (1990), for proposi-
tion that unrealized violence makes "crime of violence"); see also Chatman, 986 F.2d
at 1451 (citing PofJ).
73. See Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (characterizing defi-
nition as abnormal term of art); see also Weddle, 30 F.3d at 539 (noting that it was
proper to define "non-violent offense" without tying it to "crime of violence");
Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451 (quoting Poff dissent that sections "address entirely dif-
ferent issues"). Additionally, sections 4B1.2 and 5K2.13 were designed to address
different concerns and issues. See id. (discussing policy concerns). Section 4B1.1
prescribes a formula to determine whether a defendant meets criteria to be classi-
fied as a career offender and, as a result, is subject to longer terms of incarcera-
tion. See id. at 540 n.3 (noting that purpose of section 4B1.2 is to define terms of
art utilized in section 4B1.2). The Chatman court noted:
In section 994(h), Congress directed the Commission to ensure that the
Guidelines specify prison sentences that are "at or near the maximum
term authorized" for "career offenders," which include those who have
"been convicted of a felony that is either a crime of violence or a drug
offense and who ha[ve] been previously convicted of two felonies where
each was either a 'crime of violence' or a drug offense .... " Longer
sentences for such offenders are justified by the purposes of incarcera-
tion, as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988) and discussed in the
Introductory Commentary to Part A of Chapter 4 of the Guidelines ....
Reflecting these policy concerns, the definition of "crime of vio-
lence" in section 4B1.2 is a distinctively crafted "term of art," ... designed
to identify career offenders .... [S]ection 4B1.2 appears to characterize
as "crimes of violence" many offenses that, taken individually on their
facts, might be interpreted as non-violent.
Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451 (citations omitted).
74. See Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (asserting that sec-
tion 4B1.2 does not apply to section 5K2.13). Judge Easterbrook noted: "A 'non-
violent offense' in ordinary legal . . .understanding is one in which mayhem did
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Moreover, the Chatman court specifically noted that the term "crime
of violence" is geared toward identifying career offenders, though the
term "non-violent offense" in section 5K2.13 refers "to those offenses that,
in the act, reveal that a defendant is not dangerous, and therefore need
not be incapacitated for the period of time the Guidelines would other-
wise recommend. '75 Finally, these courts indicated that, from a policy
standpoint, the intent of section 4B1.2 was to treat the career offender
severely, where section 5K2.13's intent was to create lenity for those with
diminished mental capacity. 76
III. TowARDS AN AMENDMENT TO SECTION 5K2.13: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S
DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. ASKARI
On April 23, 1992, Muhammad Askari robbed the First Bank of Phila-
delphia. 77 The police apprehended Askari, who was unarmed and suf-
fering from paranoid schizophrenia, approximately two blocks from
the crime scene. 78 After two years of psychiatric treatment, the district
court found Askari competent and sentenced him to 210 months in
prison. 7
9
not occur. The prospect of violence ... sets the presumptive range; when things
turn out better than they might, departure is permissible." Id.
75. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451-52 (noting policy behind section 5K2.13).
76. See Poff 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (discussing policy
arguments behind section 5K2.13).
77. See Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536 (3d Cir.
1998) (No. 95-1662) (noting that facts are undisputed).
78. See id. at 4 (discussing apprehension); see also United States v. Askari, 140
F.3d 536, 537 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing lapse in competency). The attend-
ing psychiatrist indicated that Askari was "too delusional to be able to cooperate
with his attorney." Id. at 537 n.1 (discussing competency to stand trial). Upon
examination, a psychiatrist concluded that Askari suffered from paranoid schizo-
phrenia, drug addiction and seizure disorder. See id. (discussing diagnosis). Ac-
cording to mental health professionals, the essential feature of paranoid
schizophrenia is the presence of delusions or auditory hallucinations in a context
where cognitive functioning and affect are preserved. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV-TR 312 (4th ed.
text rev. 2000) (establishing diagnostic criteria); LEE N. ROBINS & DARREL A.
REGIER, PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER IN AMERICA 33 (1991) (discussing base rates of
mental illness in United states). Experts estimate that approximately two to four
million people in the United States meet criteria for schizophrenia at any given
time. See id. ROBINS & RECIER, supra, at 33. In addition to the social costs, schizo-
phrenia also imposes a significant financial burden on society. See id. at 34 (dis-
cussing health care expenditures for patients). Individuals diagnosed with
schizophrenia occupy approximately thirty percent of available hospital beds na-
tionwide. See id. (noting that this amounts to approximately 100,000 beds on any
given day). As a result, the treatment of schizophrenic patients costs the nation
approximately $7 billion annually in health care costs. See id. (noting that expendi-
tures for schizophrenia is equivalent to financial burden imposed by all forms of
cancer combined).
79. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 537-38 (discussing reasons for commitment and
eventual sentencing). The district court committed Askari to the United States
694 [Vol. 46: p. 679
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Muhammad Askari appealed his sentence, claiming that he was enti-
tled to a downward departure pursuant to section 5K2.13 because his of-
fense was non-violent.80 Askari, acting alone, completely unarmed and
suffering from diminished capacity, provided a catalyst for the complete
revamping of section 5K2.13.81
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
holding of the district court, finding that the definition of crime of vio-
lence contained in the career offender provision did not govern the mean-
ing of non-violent offenses in the Guidelines' policy statement permitting
downward departure for diminished capacity.8 2 In affirming the district
court, the Third Circuit abrogated its prior holding in United States v. Ro-
sen"3 by applying an analytical framework adopted by a growing minority
of other circuit courts.8 4 In finding that the crime of violence definition
of section 4B1.2 did not apply to section 5K2.13, the court established new
precedent in the Third Circuit consistent with the philosophy and policy
statements of the United States Sentencing Commission, and that which
would soon thereafter be codified into new section 5K2.13.85
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri for psychiatric care
and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (1998). See id. at 537-38.
80. For a discussion of the arguments asserted by Askari in favor of downward
departure, see infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
81. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. background
(1998) (citing Askari as one reason for amendment to section 5K2.13).
82. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 550 (discussing holding). Although the Askari court
abrogated the analytical framework established in United States v. Rosen, the defen-
dant's sentence was affirmed because his offense did not meet the Askari courts
definition of non-violent offense. See id. at 549-50.
83. 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding "non-violent offense" means
opposite of "crime of violence"), overruled by United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536
(3d Cir. 1998).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994) (adopt-
ing minority approach); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (finding section 4B1.2 does not control application of section 5K2.13); see
also Askari, 140 F.3d at 537 & n.2 (noting that four other circuits had adopted
minority approach). In a concurring opinion, the Askari court recognized that the
decision in Rosen is incorrect and should be reconsidered by the court en banc. See
id. at 537 (Becker, J., concurring) (suggesting that downward departure under
section 5K2.13 is available when commission of crime involves no violence in fact).
85. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1998) (codifying basic
holding of Askari into section 5K2.13). According to Judge Becker:
While "crimes of violence" and "non-violent offense" employ the same
root word, the phrases "readily may take meanings other than as oppo-
sites." ... More importantly, the distinct objectives of the two provisions
... counsel that the meaning of the former not govern that of the later
... . In short, some factors at work in the departure sections of the
Guidelines are in tension with those at work under the career offender
sections, and it does not make sense to import a career offender-based
definition of "crime of violence" into a departure section in the absence
of specific cross-reference. Rather, it is better to permit the district courts
to consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission
of a crime when deciding whether it qualifies as a non-violent offense
under § 5K2.13.
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In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit in Askari initially revis-
ited its decision in Rosen.811 In Rosen, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's holding, noting that, although the crime at issue was com-
mitted without the use of physical force, it nevertheless did not qualify as a
non-violent offense.8 7 By affirming the district court, the Rosen court
adopted the definition of crime of violence found in section 4B1.2 of the
Guidelines, which made such a departure under section 5K2.13 wholly
inapplicable.88
Askari, 140 F.3d at 537-38 (Becker, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Poff 926
F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook,J., dissenting).
86. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 542 (discussing facts of Rosen). In Rosen, the defen-
dant pled guilty to extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2000). See id. (ex-
plaining that defendant violated statute by mailing threatening communications in
order to extort money). The defendant in Rosen was an admitted compulsive gam-
bler. See id. (citing Rosen). At his sentencing hearing, the defendant presented
expert testimony regarding his mental condition and argued for downward depar-
ture tinder section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines. See id. (noting that Rosen stated he
had no intention to carry out threats). The district court in Rosen refused to grant
the departure, holding that compulsive gambling did notjustify departure. See id.
(discussing holding in Rosen). The district court held that the defendant's mental
condition was not a mitigating factor. See id. (noting court's refusal to acknowl-
edge compulsive gambling as mitigating psychiatric illness). Second, the court
concluded that the defendant's crime was not non-violent. See id. The defendant
was sentenced under section 2B3.2 of the Guidelines. See id. Section 2B3.2 covers
extortion by force or threat of injury or serious damage. See U.S. SENTENCING
GuIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.2 (2000) (discussing section 2B3.2). The application
notes of section 2B3.2 of the Guidelines provides in relevant part:
This guideline applies if there was any threat, express or implied, that
reasonably could be interpreted as one to injure a person or physically
damage property, or any comparably serious threat . . . . Even if the
threat does not in itself imply violence, the possibility of violence or seri-
ous adverse consequences may be inferred from the circumstances of the
threat or the reputation of the person making it. An ambiguous threat,
such as "pay up or else," . . . ordinarily should be treated under this
section.
Id. § 2B3.2 n.2.
87. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 542 (citing appropriate definition of crime of vio-
lence). First, the court in Rosen looked to 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988) and section 2B1.2
of the Guidelines. See id. Based on both of these sections, the court in Rosen con-
cluded that section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines provided the appropriate definition of
crime of violence. See id. (finding no merit in defendant's argument).
88. See id. (finding no support for defendant's contention in other jurisdic-
tions); see also United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989) (utilizing
section 4B1.2's definition of crime of violence); cf. United States v. Poff, 723 F.
Stipp. 79, 84 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (same). The Askari court also noted that it had
recently cited Rosen as controlling precedent. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 542 (explain-
ing precedential value of Rosen); United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 542 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citing Rosen and utilizing section 4B1.2 definition of crime of violence);
see also Joseph A. Slobodzian, Volition New Factor in Sentencing: Diminished Capacity
Includes 'Compelled' Act, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 1997, at A6 (discussing McBroom and
expanding definition of diminished mental capacity).
The Askari court first noted that there is considerable question in other circuit
courts of appeals over whether the phrase non-violent offense in section 5K2.13
should be defined by utilizing the crime of violence definition found in section
4B1.2 of the Guidelines. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 543. Specifically, the Askari court
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The Seventh Circuit's majority decision in Poff provided a significant
point of departure for the Third Circuit in Askari.8 9 After detailing the
noted that the majority of the circuit courts of appeals subscribe to the position
that the crime of violence definition found in section 4B1.2 should be applied to
the phrase "non-violent offense" found in section 5K2.13. See Askari, 140 F.3d at
543. Conversely, the Askari court identified the growing minority of circuit courts
of appeals that subscribe to the position that the district court's discretion to grant
downward departures under section 5K2.13 should not be controlled by the crime
of violence definition of section 4B1.2. See id. Although the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Poff stands with the majority of circuits, five dissenting judges shared the
view of the minority of the circuits. See id. (citing Poffs 6-5 decision).
The First Circuit had examined numerous cases under pre-amendment sec-
tion 5K2.13. See generally United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (af-
firming trial court's determination that mental illness did not contribute to
commission of offense); United States v. Robles-Torres, 109 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 1997)
(finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to depart down-
ward for mental illness); United States v. Morrison, 46 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that no departure was warranted for depression); United States v. De-
Costa, 37 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that district court found case unexcep-
tional and could not justify departure); United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462 (lst
Cir. 1994) (remanding for resentencing because district court felt it lacked discre-
tion to depart); United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
no departure for delusional condition was warranted); United States v. Barnett,
989 F.2d 546 (1st Cir. 1993) (upholding denial of departure for short-term mem-
ory loss); United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that di-
minished capacity did not contribute to commission of crime); United States v.
Fulton, 960 F. Supp. 479 (D. Mass. 1997) (granting downward departure for past
childhood abuse due to violent nature of crime in instant case); Norflett v. United
States, 981 F. Supp. 718 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding mental illness not appropriate
grounds for departure).
The Second Circuit also had examined numerous cases under section 5K2.13.
See generally United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that career
offender guidelines do not permit downward departure for diminished capacity);
United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to grant down-
ward departure); United States v. Miller, 993 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1993) (granting
upward departure due to psychological harm to victim); United States v. Prescott,
920 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying departure for borderline personality disor-
der); United States v. Acosta, 846 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting down-
ward departure for mental retardation); United States v. Marquez, 827 F. Supp.
205 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that evidence did not warrant downward departure);
United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting downward depar-
ture for mental retardation and vulnerability).
The Fifth Circuit also had the opportunity to examine numerous cases under
section 5K2.13. See generally United States v. Soliman, 954 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1992) (holding depression insufficient for downward departure).
The Tenth Circuit also had the opportunity to examine cases under section
5K2.13. See generally United States v. Webb, 49 F.3d 636 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
diagnosis of personality disorder insufficient for downward departure); United
States v. Eagan, 965 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding bipolar disorder insuffi-
cient for downward departure in instant case); United States v. Fox, 930 F.2d 820
(10th Cir. 1991) (noting that unarmed bank robbery is "violent offense"); United
States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that court lacked juris-
diction to review lower court's determination that reduced mental capacity was
insufficient for downward departure).
89. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 543 (stating that Poff majority provides "elaborate
argument" in favor of its opinion). The Askari court identified the main points of
2001]
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majority view among the circuits, the Askari court enumerated the minor-
ity positions as articulated by the dissent in Poff and as expanded by the
courts in Chatman and Weddle.90 Considering both views, the en banc Askari
the Poff majority's decision. See id. at 543-44. First, the Poff majority emphasized
the similarity between the two phrases and concluded that the word violent "likely
bears [the] same meaning in both instances." Id. at 543. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Poff majority focused on the root word "violence." See id. In reaching this
conclusion, the Poff court focused on the fact that the Sentencing Commission
used the same word-violence-as a root for both phrases. See id. The Poff major-
ity indicated that the root word was the same despite the fact that one is used as a
negative and the other is used as a modifier. See id. Second, the majority in Poff
turned to the Armed Career Offender Provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (B) (i) to
further support its contention that section 4B1.2 should control section 5K2.13.
See id. at 543-44 (noting Poff majority's second assertion). According to the Poff
majority, the Armed Career Offender Provision mirrors the crime of violence defi-
nition found in section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines. See id. at 544 (citing Pof]).
In section 924(e) (2) (B) (i), Congress defined a violent felony as any crime
that "'has as an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against another .... ." Id. (quoting Poff majority's reading of section
924(e) (2) (B) (i)). Finding no practical distinction between the two definitions,
the Poff majority reasoned that if it is difficult to discern a difference between
crime of violence and violent felony, "'it is well nigh impossible to divine any dis-
tinction between "violent felony" and a "violent offense" '." See id. (quoting major-
ity in Pofj). Expanding on this line of thought, the Poff majority attempted to
address the intent of the Sentencing Commission regarding the phrases found in
sections 4B1.2 and 5K2.13. See id. (noting Poff majority's third assertion). Specifi-
cally, the Poff majority indicated that "if the ... Commission wanted to differenti-
ate between different types of violence, it would have expressly [done so in
5K2.13]." Id. The Poff court noted in concluding this point that even if the Com-
mission had intended different meanings for the two phrases, there is no guidance
in the Guidelines to determine its meaning. See id. (quoting Poff majority stating
"we could do little but guess as to its meaning").
The Askari court then noted the Poff majority's policy arguments in favor of
interpreting the two phrases similarly. See id. at 544 (considering underlying objec-
tives of two provisions). First, the Poff majority noted that the Guidelines reflect a
view that offenders with a history of violent offenses, including threats of violence,
should receive longer sentences. See id. The Poff majority also observed that sec-
tion 5K2.13 limits the authority of courts to decrease sentences due to diminished
mental capacity to instances where the defendant committed a non-violent offense.
See id. (asserting that section 5K2.13 is intended to discourage inappropriate de-
partures). Similarly, the Poff court asserted that the Commission further limited
the ability of courts to depart by adding the phrase "'the defendant's criminal
history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public."' Id.
Finally, the Poff majority indicated that individuals suffering from mental dis-
orders are less amenable to treatment, making the need for prolonged incarcera-
tion more urgent. See id. Based on all of these assertions, the majority in Poff
concluded that the Commission believed departures for diminished capacity
under section 5K2.13 were only warranted when there is little chance of violent
behavior. See id. (noting that this interpretation would not subvert intent of
Commission).
90. See id. at 544 (noting rationale of Poffdissent). As a basis for its own hold-
ing, the Askari court outlined the principal arguments set forth by the Poff dissent,
starting with the text of section 5K2.13. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 544 (discussing
textual argument of Poffdissent). Regarding the text of section 5K2.13, the minor-
ity of courts note that there is nothing in the Guidelines, accompanying notes or
legislative history that suggests section 4B1.2 was meant to be applied to section
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court examined the language, structure and purpose of the Guidelines,
and reconsidered the definition of non-violent offense found in section
5K2.13.91 Contrary to its earlier holding in Rosen, the Askari court found
that the analysis set forth by the minority view was more convincing.
9 2
Although the court in Askari declined to detail its own reasoning, it
did note that there were four significant points in the minority view that it
found exceedingly persuasive. 9 3 First, the Askari court recognized that sec-
tion 5K2.13 was devoid of any cross-reference to the crime of violence defi-
nition located in section 4B1.2. 94 Indeed, the court found this lack of
reference highly instructive in light of numerous amendments to the
Guidelines by the Commission.
9 5
Second, the Askari court noted that downward departures, pursuant
to section 5K2.13, are limited to "defendants whose criminal history does
not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public." 9 6 Accord-
ingly, the court found that this succeeded in removing section 5K2.13 de-
5K2.13. See id. (citing United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir.
1993)). The Chatman court noted that some courts interpret the intent of the
Sentencing Commission as requiring a crime to be characterized as a violent crime
within section 4B1.2 if any one of the crimes' statutory elements involves
threatened use of physical force. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 (noting that spe-
cific facts and circumstances of offense are disregarded under this approach). The
Askari court noted that the minority view suggests that the omission of the phrase
"crime of violence" or a cross-reference to section 5K2.13 was done intentionally by
the Commission to prevent section 4B1.2 from being applied to section 5K2.13.
See Askari, 140 F.3d at 544-45. The Askari court noted:
It would have been easy to write § 5K2.13 to say that the judge may depart
unless the defendant committed a "crime of violence" as § 4B1.2 defines
it; instead, the Commission selected different formulations. Although it
laid out a detailed meaning for "crime of violence" in § 4B1.2, it did not
provide so much as a cross-reference in § 5K2.13, a curious omission if
the Commission meant to link these phrases so tightly that they are mutu-
ally exclusive.
Id. at 545 (quoting Poff, 926 F.2d at 594; Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450). Similarly, the
Askari court noted that despite numerous amendments, the Commission had
never altered section 5K2.13 to incorporate the crime of violence definition of
section 4B1.2. See id. (citing Poff and Chatman for proposition that section 4B1.2's
"crime of violence" was not incorporated into section 5K2.13 "non-violent
offense").
91. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 546 (discussing court's initial view of section
5K2.13). The Askari court noted that the initial view as expressed in Rosen was a
reasoned interpretation that now represents the majority opinion among the cir-
cuit courts of appeals. See id. (discussing opinion in Rosen).
92. See id. (noting with favor view expressed in dissent in Poff and majority
opinions in Chatman and Weddle).
93. See id. (noting most compelling arguments).
94. See id. (detailing first point of agreement). Although the Sentencing
Commission amended the Guidelines over five-hundred times in the last nine
years, there has never been a cross-reference to the two sections in question. See id.
95. See id. (referencing lack of interdependence between sections 4B1.2 and
5K2.13).
96. See id. (limiting section 5K2.13 to criminals with no history of need for
incarceration).
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partures from the reach of career offenders. 9 7 Elaborating its rationale,
the Askari court found that this safeguard makes it unnecessary to incorpo-
rate the definition of non-violent offense from section 4B1.2.9 8
Third, the Askari court noted that section 1BI.1 of the Guidelines ar-
ticulates a list of definitions for general applicability.99 Upon examina-
tion, the court found that this list of general definitions did not include
definitions for crime of violence or non-violent offense.1 00 As such, the
Askari court indicated that the definition contained in section 4B1.2 was
not designated for general applicability and, therefore, should not be con-
sidered when applying section 5K2.13.101
Finally, the court in Askari noted that the policy concerns of sections
4B1.2 and 5K2.13 are different; section 4B1.2 is punitive in nature whereas
section 5K2.13 fosters a policy of lenity. 1° 2 Based upon these points, the
court concluded that the section 4B1.2 definition of crime of violence
should not be applied to section 5K2.13.13
Although the Askari court adopted the minority view that section
4B1.2 should not be applied to section 5K2.13, it expressed a different
view of the applicable standard to evaluate a potential downward depar-
ture. 10 4 In cases expressing the majority viewpoint, the Askari court di-
rected the district court judge to "make a fact specific inquiry [into]
whether the defendant ha[d] committed a 'non-violent offense." 10 5 Ac-
cordingly, the Askari court had to address the remaining question of
97. See id. at 546 (noting limits of section 5K2.13 application to parties with-
out a history of repeated criminal activity).
98. See id. (articulating second point of agreement with minority position).
99. See id. (articulating third point of agreement and noting lack of general-
ization of two definitions).
100. See id. (noting detailed inquiry into language of Guidelines).
101. See id. (discussing section 1BI.1 of Guidelines). The Askari court noted
that this provision provides that: "[d]efinitions ... [which] appear in other sec-
tions . . . are not designated for general applicability; therefore their applicability
to sections other than those expressly referenced must be determined on a case by
case basis." Id. (alteration in original).
102. See id. (discussing policy concerns).
103. See id. at 546-47 (stating that crime of violence definition is not inapplica-
ble to section 5K2.13). Specifically, the court stated:
In short, the choice of different phrasing, the absence of a cross-refer-
ence, and the explicit definitions attached to one section but not the
other, all suggest that the Sentencing Commission did not intend to im-
port the ... definition from . . . § 4B1.2 to ... § 5K2.13. Of course, the
Sentencing Commission could adopt a definition of "non-violent offense"
which, if in conformity with the statute, could be binding on the district
judge. Or it could delete the reference to "non-violent offense" in ...
§ 5K2.13. But in the absence of some direction from the Sentencing
Commission, we are unwilling to apply the "crime of violence" definition
articulated in . . . § 4B1.2 to . . . § 5K2.13.
Id.
104. See id. at 547 (accepting minority view but taking different view of appro-
priate standard).
105. See id. (questioning standard applied by courts in Chatman and Pofj).
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whether there were any constraints on a district court's review of the facts
and surrounding circumstances of the crime.10 6
In determining whether there were any constraints upon a court's re-
view of the facts and circumstances of the crime, the Askari court began by
discussing modern criminology and the Sentencing Reform Act.' 0 7 The
court noted that traditionally there has been a distinction between a find-
ing of guilt and an imposition of a sentence.' 0 8 Additionally, the Askari
court noted that until the advent of the Guidelines, courts looked to the
facts and circumstances of each case before deciding on an appropriate
sentence. 0 9 According to the Askari court, the implementation of the
Sentencing Reform Act brought rigid sanctions and diminished the role of
the courts in the sentencing process.' 10 The court noted that the Com-
mission consequently attempted to mitigate the harsh consequences of
mandatory sentences through the mechanism of the downward
departure.'I I
Next, the court in Askari conceded that the district court should con-
sider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, but condi-
tioned this approach on the application of the Sentencing Reform Act and
the appropriate statutory language defining criminal culpability.1 2 Find-
ing no guidance from the Commission on how to define the phrase "non-
violent offense," the court looked to the Sentencing Reform Act, which
articulates several factors used in determining sentences. 1 3 Based upon
106. See id. (beginning analysis of appropriate standard).
107. See id. (discussing court's diminishing role in sentencing process); see also
Ami L. Feinstein et al., Federal Sentencing, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1079, 1114 (1993)
(noting that commentators' reaction to Guidelines was predominantly negative);
Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1247, 1247-48 (1997) (noting that appellate review of sentencing deci-
sions was significant accomplishment of Sentencing Reform Act).
108. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 547 (discussing distinction between culpability and
sanction); Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J.
393, 393 (1991) (noting "four competing sanction goals: punishment, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation").
109. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 547 (discussing courts unique role in sentencing).
110. See id. (discussing changes brought by sentencing reform). Since the
adoption of the Guidelines, the mere fact of conviction has carried rigid sanctions.
See id. (noting that even unconvicted conduct can be punished as relevant
conduct).
111. See id. (noting that departure decisions are multifaceted decisions). Ac-
knowledging the role of downward departure in sentencing, the Askari court stated
that from a pure policy standpoint, the Commission did not intend to allow depar-
tures under section 5K2.13 for dangerous or violent offenders. See id. (questioning
whether Guideline structure can provide departure in every case where it is
appropriate).
112. See id. (discussing appropriate standard for assessing criminal
culpability).
113. See id. (discussing enabling statute of Sentencing Reform Act); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (discussing application of guidelines in imposing a sen-
tence). Section 3553(b) provides in relevant part:
2001]
23
Miller: Diminished Capacity - Expanded Discretion: Section 5K2.13 of the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
VILIANOVA LAW REVIEW
these enumerated factors, the court found that the point of departure for
determining the seriousness of the offense is to look at the statutory ele-
ments of the crime and the surrounding conduct.11 4
Following this analysis, the Askari court expressed the view that depar-
tures under section 5K2.13 "exclude conduct that involves actual force,
threat of force, or intimidation, the latter two measured under a reasona-
ble person standard."" 15 Accordingly, the court concluded that non-vio-
lent offenses under section 5K2.13 "are those which do not involve a
reasonable perception that force against persons may be used in commit-
ting the offense."
1 6
The Askari court also addressed the argument that conduct may be
statutorily violent, yet still warrant leniency due to diminished mental ca-
pacity and a lack of a dangerous criminal history. 117 Specifically, the court
inquired whether downward departure under section 5K2.13 is warranted
in cases where violence was threatened but not realized.' 8 The court af-
firmatively concluded that downward departures under section 5K2.13 are
warranted in cases where the offense at issue is one involving instances
where a threat of violence is never carried out. 119
In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall im-
pose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes set
forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable sentencing
guideline in the case of an offense other than a petty offense, the court
shall also have due regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to
sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar offenses and of-
fenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission.
Id. Simply put, the Sentencing Reform Act articulates factors used in the determi-
nation of sentences. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 547 n.13 (noting that Guidelines seem
to supplant factors). Section 1BI.] of the Guidelines defines "offense" as "the of-
fense of conviction and all relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)
unless a different meaning is specified or is otherwise clear from the context." U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.1 n.1 (2000). The Askari court defined
bank robbery in accordance with the Guidelines as "taking, or attempting to take,
anything of value, by force and violence, by intimidation, or by extortion." See
Askari, 140 F.3d at 548 (noting language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)). Similarly, the
Askari court noted that the force, violence or intimidation elements require "proof
of force or threat of force as an element of the offense." Id. (citing United States v.
Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989)). The court defined intimidation as
to make fearful or put into fear." Id. (citing United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349,
1357 (5th Cir. 1994)).
114. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 54748 (defining point of departure).
115. Id. at 549.
116. Id. Therefore, if a bank robbery victim is threatened with harm, and the
threat can be realized under an objective reasonable person standard, the offense
must be violent in nature. See id. (noting that conviction and sentence must be
congruent).
117. See id. (noting other grounds for departure).
118. See id. (drawing distinction between realized and unrealized threats of
violence).
119. See id. at 549 & n.18 (stating that there is no impediment to this interpre-
tation in Guidelines). Even after applying this interpretation of section 5K2.13,
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One day after the Third Circuit decided Askari, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission amended section 5K2.13.120 "When the terms of this
amendment-which applies to pending cases-was revealed, Askari
sought reconsideration of the en banc decision." 12 '
IV. SENTENCING COMMISSION AMENDS SECTION 5K2.13: ITS IMPACT AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEPARTURE
A. The Language of New Section 5K2.13
In January of 1998, approximately two months before the Third Cir-
cuit decision was handed down in Askari, the United States Sentencing
Commission began the task of settling the growing circuit debate by
amending section 5K2.13.122 After considering four different options, the
Commission ultimately settled on a "compromise" version that effectively
eliminated the language previously used and adopted a wholly new phrase-
ology.123 Significantly, the language of the amended section 5K2.13 is de-
void of any reference to either non-violent offense or to competing section
4B1.2's definition of crime of violence.
124
the Askari court held that the defendant had not committed a non-violent offense.
See id. at 549-50 & n.18. The court took particular note of the testimony of the
bank teller who stated: "And then I gave him my money . . . [I was scared]
[b]ecause he had his hand in his shirt and I didn't know if he was going to pull a
gun out on me or a knife or, you know, at that point I was, you know, scared." Id.
at 550 (alteration in original). Therefore, the court concluded that an "ordinary
person in the bank teller's position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm
from Askari's demand and actions." Id. The court reasoned that based on the
elements of the crime and the surrounding conduct, the defendant did not com-
mit a non-violent offense. See id. Therefore, the Askari court held that the defen-
dant did not qualify for downward departure under section 5K2.13 "because he
did not commit a 'non-violent offense."' Id.
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 n.1 (2000) (stating
that amendment takes effect November 1, 1998)
121. See Case Law Developments: Criminal Incompetency, 23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILrrv L. REP. 39, 42-43 (1999) (discussing facts of Askari and impact of Guide-
line amendment).
122. See id. at 42 (noting that one day after decision in Askai was handed
down Commission adopted an amendment to section 5K2.13); see also Notice of Pro-
posed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and Commentary, 63 Fed.
Reg. 632 (Jan. 6, 1998) (discussing proposed amendments to section 5K2.13). In
January of 1998, the Federal Sentencing Commission, reacting to a split among the
circuit courts of appeals, decided to consider four proposed amendments to
5K2.13. See id. (describing proposals to amend section 5K2.13).
123. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2000) (describing
departure for diminished mental capacity). Notably, the language the Commis-
sion ultimately adopted not only failed to explicitly adopt either the majority or
minority view, but also omitted the term "crime of violence" from the text of sec-
tion 5K2.13. See id. (stating that crimes involving actual violence or serious threat
of violence are exempt from being considered for diminished mental capacity
downward departure).
124. See id. (describing activities that do not qualify for diminished mental
capacity downward departure.)
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The first option that the Commission considered-and invited public
comments upon-adopted the majority appellate view as expressed in
Poff125 This option would have kept the language of section 5K2.13 as
previously drafted while merely inserting a clarifying phrase. 126 This op-
tion struck the term "non-violent offense" and replaced it with "an offense
other than a crime of violence." 12 7 More significant, however, was its pro-
posed application note that instructed a district court to consult section
4B1.2 for a definition of "a crime of violence."1 2
8
The second proposed amendment to section 5K2.13 that the Com-
mission considered adopted the minority appellate view of the diminished
capacity departure. 1 2 9 Although this proposed amendment would have
retained part of the original language of section 5K2.13, the majority of
the language of section 5K2.13 was stricken and new language was inserted
in its stead.1 30 Under this option, the district court, when applying section
125. See Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements,
and Commentary, 63 Fed. Reg. at 632 (describing four prospective candidates for
new language of section 5K2.13). According to this first option, the language of
section 5K2.13 was to remain essentially the same. See id. (noting proposed lan-
guage of first option). Under option one, the new section 5K2.13 would have read
as follows:
If the defendant committed an offense other than a crime of violence
while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting
from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a sentence below the
applicable guideline range may be warranted to reflect the extent to
which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the of-
fense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a
need for incarceration to protect the public.
Id.
126. See id. (describing applicable conduct). Notably, this proposed amend-
ment struck the term "non-violent offense" and inserted the phrase "an offense
other than a crime of violence." See id. (proposing omission of term "non-violent
offense" from language of section 5K2.13).
127. See id. (noting change of phraseology).
128. See id. (defining crime of violence). According to the application note
that accompanied this proposed amendment, the definition of crime of violence is
found in section 4B1.2. See id. (finding definition of crime of violence in section
4B1.2).
129, See id. (noting that option two adopts minority appellate view). Accord-
ing to this potential amendment, when considering the propriety of a diminished
capacity departure, the district court should consider the totality of the circum-
stances in order to determine whether the offense was non-violent. See id. (describ-
ing role of district court in determining whether crime of violence took place).
130. See id. (noting language of second option). Under option two, the new
section 5K2.13 would have read as follows:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from
significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of
drugs or other intoxicants, a sentence below the applicable guideline
range may be warranted. In determining whether an offense is non-vio-
lent, the court should consider the totality of the facts and circumstances
of the offense. If the facts and circumstances of the offense or the defen-
dant's criminal history indicate the defendant is dangerous such that
there is a need for incarceration to protect the public, a departure under
this policy statement is not warranted. If a departure is warranted, the
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5K2.13, would consider the totality of the circumstances in order to deter-
mine whether the offense was non-violent.' "" According to the Sentenc-
ing Commission's Synopsis of Proposed Amendments, this second option
"define[d] the scope of the departure broadly to allow consideration of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime in
determining whether a defendant is dangerous."1
32
The third proposed amendment to section 5K2.13-the one ulti-
mately adopted by the Sentencing Commission-was deemed to be a
"compromise" version of pre-amendment section 5K2.13.133 This pro-
posed version of section 5K2.13 wholly abandoned the language previously
used and focused upon a general policy statement followed by three nota-
ble exceptions. Conspicuously omitted from the language of this proposal
was the term "non-violent offense" as well as any reference to section
4B1.2.13 4
The fourth and final proposal the Commission considered would
have eliminated the non-violent offense element while retaining the re-
maining language of section 5K2.13.135 Purportedly, this option had the
potential of eliminating the conflicting viewpoints among the federal cir-
departure should reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity
contributed to the commission of the offense.
Id.
131. See id. (finding applicable standard for district court when reviewing
whether offense was non-violent).
132. Id. (discussing four options presented).
133. See id. (labeling third option as "compromise" version).
134. See id. (inserting terms "actual violence" and "serious threat of violence"
in place of "non-violent offense"). Moreover, the application notes that accompa-
nied this proposed version of section 5K2.13 defined "significantly reduced mental
capacity." See id. According to this application note, "'[s]ignificantly reduced
mental capacity' means the defendant is unable to (A) understand the wrongful-
ness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or
(B) control behavior that the defendant-knows is wrongful." Id.
135. See id. (describing fourth option considered by Commission). Under
this option, the Commission would have eliminated the "non-violent offense" ele-
ment while retaining the majority of the original language. See id. (stating fourth
proposed option for section 5K2.13 language). According to this proposal, section
5K2.13 would have read:
If the defendant committed the offense while suffering from significantly
reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or
other intoxicants, a sentence below the applicable guideline range may
be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity con-
tributed to the commission of the offense, unless the nature and circum-
stances of the offense or the defendant's criminal history indicate a need
for incarceration to protect the public.
2001]
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cuits while retaining most of the original language.' 36 This proposal, how-
ever, ultimately was rejected. 137
After public comment and consideration of the four potential candi-
dates for the amendment language, the Commission adopted the third
option: the "compromise" version of section 5K2.13.13 8 The language of
section 5K2.13, as agreed upon by the Commission, currently reads:
A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be war-
ranted if the defendant committed the offense while suffering
from a significantly reduced mental capacity. However, the court
may not depart below the applicable guideline range if (1) the
significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary
use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances
of the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public
because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of
violence; or (3) the defendant's criminal history indicates a need
to incarcerate the defendant to protect the public. If a departure
is warranted, the extent of the departure should reflect the ex-
tent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the
commission of the offense. 139
Not only does this new version of section 5K2.13 explicitly address the
"circuit conflict regarding whether the diminished capacity departure is
precluded if the defendant committed a 'crime of violence' as that term is
defined in the career offender guideline," but it also "adds an application
note that defines 'significantly reduced mental capacity' in accord with the
[Third Circuit's] decision in United States v. McBroom."' 4 0
Although section 5K2.13 was amended as a result of the disagreement
among the circuit courts of appeals as to the definition and application of
the non-violent offense language previously utilized, the question re-
mained whether the circuits that had adopted the majority viewpoint
136. See id. (discussing reason for proposed amendment). According to tile
Commission, "[t] his amendment addresses the circuit conflict regarding whether a
diminished capacity departure is precluded if the defendant committed a 'crime of
violence' as that term is defined in the career offender guideline." Id. In describ-
ing the reason for the proposed amendment, the Commission cited the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Poff the Ninth Circuit's decision in Borrayo, the Third Circuit's
decision in Rosen, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Dailey, the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in Chatman, and the Fourth Circuit's decision in Weddle. See id.
(noting four options and reason for amendment).
137. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2000)
(adopting language utilized in third option).
138. See id. (describing conduct available for downward departure under di-
minished capacity section of Guidelines).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1130 (describing reason and applicability of section 5K2.13); see
also Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and Com-
mentary, 63 Fed. Reg. at 632 (discussing circuit split).
[Vol. 46: p. 679
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol46/iss3/6
COMMENT
would read the new version of the diminished capacity downward depar-
ture as expressly disallowing any reference to section 4B1.2. 14 1
B. Current and Future Section 5K2.13 Jurisprudence
When the Commission embraced this new version of section 5K2.13,
they explicitly withheld language from the amendment which would have
adopted either the majority or minority approach. 142 Instead, the Com-
mission opted for a "compromise" approach that, arguably, would have no
direct impact on the section 5K2.13 debate.1 43 By failing to expressly
adopt one view over the other, the Commission potentially fumbled its
best chance to clarify the violence prong of section 5K2.13.144 Moreover,
the language ultimately adopted by the Commission led some to opine
that the new section 5K2.13 would have virtually no effect on the circuit
split upon which the amendment was premised.1 45 The language ulti-
mately selected, however, has led at least one circuit to reconsider its prior
section 5K2.13 jurisprudence. 146
141. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2000) (omitting
term "non-violent offense"), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13
(1998) (including "non-violent offense" element in section 5K2.13's diminished
capacity language). When the Commission was considering whether to amend sec-
tion 5K2.13 and, if so, what language to adopt, it considered four proposals. See
Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and Commen-
tay, 63 Fed. Reg. at 632 (noting four options considered). In doing so, the Com-
mission acknowledged the circuit split and the majority and minority view that had
arisen. See id. (citing majority and minority positions). The version of section
5K2.13 that the Commission ultimately adopted did not explicitly embrace either
view. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2000) (describing con-
duct warranting diminished mental capacity).
142. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2000) (defining con-
duct that qualifies for departure). Nowhere in section 5K2.13 does the language
explicitly adopt one circuit view over another. See id. (stating current version). For
a discussion of post-amendment jurisprudence, see infra notes 143-60 and accom-
panying text.
143. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § SK2.13 (2000) (failing to ex-
pressly state acceptance of one viewpoint over another).
144. For a discussion of the potential impact of post-amendment section
5K2.13, see infra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
145. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2000) (noting reason
for amendment). According to the Commission:
The purpose of this amendment is to allow (except under certain circum-
stances) a diminished capacity departure if there is sufficient evidence
that the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a signifi-
cantly reduced mental capacity. This [5K2.13] amendment addresses a
circuit conflict regarding whether the diminished capacity departure is
precluded if the defendant committed a "crime of violence" as that term
is defined in the career offender guideline.
d. Unfortunately, the language ultimately selected is devoid of any explicit adop-
tion of one view over another. See id. (stating that departure is inapplicable to
offenses committed with actual violence).
146. See United States v. Allen, 181 F.3d 104, No. 98-1480, 1999 WL 282674, at
*2 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1999) (suggesting new section 5K2.13 language may change
application). According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
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The Sixth Circuit has recognized that the new language of amended
section 5K2.13 indeed has given it a new range of application. 147 In United
States v. Allen, 148 the court noted that "the policy for future cases will be to
look to the particular facts and circumstances present in an individual de-
fendant's offense when determining whether a section 5K2.13 departure is
possible .... [T] he Sentencing Commission indicated that it was making
a substantive change .... ,,149 By interpreting the new language of section
5K2.13 as embracing a "totality of the circumstances" approach, the Sixth
Circuit acknowledged that the categorical approach that it had adopted
previously was rejected by the Commission.' 50 The Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Allen not only stands for the proposition that the Commission ex-
pressly rejected the former majority approach, but it also provides other
courts that were once within the majority a basis upon which they too can
embrace the totality of the circumstances approach to defining "actual vio-
lence" or "threat of violence."' 5 1
Nowhere was the impact of the new language of section 5K2.13 so
uncertain than in the Seventh Circuit, the birthplace of Poff and its prog-
eny.152 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit has not dealt with this issue specifically, several district courts within
the Seventh Circuit have. 153 Among the most notable recent decisions are
a pair of cases in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois.' 54 In both United States v. McFadzean1 55 and United States v.
Bradshaw, 156 judge Williams noted the effect of new section 5K2.13.157 Ac-
cuit in Allen, the language adopted by the Commission indicated "that the policy
for future cases will be to look to the particular facts and circumstances present in
an individual defendant's offense when determining whether a § 5K2.13 departure
is possible." Id.
147. See id. (noting new scope of section 5K2.13 departures).
148. 181 F.3d 104, No. 98-1480, 1999 WL 282674 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1999).
149. Allen, 1999 WL 282674, at *2.
150. See id. (describing policy for future cases).
151. See, e.g., United States v. McFadzean, No. 98 CR 754, 1999 WL 1144909,
at *5 (N.D. Il. Dec. 3, 1999) (discussing new approach to section 5K2.13 assertions
for departure); United States v. Bradshaw, No. 96 CR 485-1, 1999 WL 1129601, at
*2-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1999) (noting change of language and change of applicabil-
ity of section 5K2.13).
152. See McFadzean, 1999 WL 1144909, at *5 (discussing 1998 amendment to
section 5K2.13); Bradshaw, 1999 WL 1129601, at *2-3 (noting that new section
5K2.13 is inconsistent with prior circuit application).
153. See McFadzean, 1999 WL 1144909, at *5 (finding Seventh Circuitjurispru-
dence inconsistent with present section 5K2.13 language and application); Brad-
shaw, 1999 WL 1129601, at *3 (same).
154. See McFadzean, 1999 WL 1144909, at *5 (discussing pre- and post-amend-
ment phraseology of section 5K2.13); Bradshaw, 1999 WL 1129601, at *2 (same).
155. No. 98 CR 754, 1999 WL 1144909 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1999).
156. No. 96 CR 485-1, 1999 WL 1129601 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1999).
157. See McFadzean, 1999 WL 1144909, at *5 (discussing effect of 1998 amend-
ment to section 5K2.13). In McFadzean, the defendant argued that although pre-
amendment section 5K2.13 would prohibit a downward departure in a bank rob-
bery case, new section 5K2.13 does not necessarily create such a bright line rule.
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cording to Judge Williams, "Although the Commission falls short of offer-
ing the courts a bright line rule here, [the] commentary suggests that it
intended the new language to have some effect."158 Relying on the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Allen, Judge Williams noted that "[a] strict reading of
the new language suggests that unless [a] court believes [a defendant's]
offense involve [s] actual violence or a serious threat of violence, it may (if
all other requirements are met) grant [a defendant's] motion for a down-
ward departure."1 59 In moving away from the rigid structure of defining
the violence prong of section 5K2.13 by looking to section 4B1.2, the dis-
trict court has signaled the possible demise of pre-amendment section
5K2.13 interpretation within the circuits that were once in the majority. 160
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide an overly broad and
extremely rigid structure for the sentencing of criminal offenders.' 6 1 As
such, tension has developed between the need to protect society from dan-
gerous criminal offenders and the need to show leniency towards those
offenders who suffer from diminished mental capacity and commit crimes
devoid of either actual violence or a serious threat of violence. 16 2 By im-
plicitly rejecting the proposition that the crime of violence definition of
See id. (noting impact of new section 5K2.13). According to the district court in
Mcadzean, the amendment to section 5K2.13 superceded prior case law and war-
ranted a new interpretation of downward departures for diminished mental capac-
ity. See id. (finding prior case law outdated in light of amendment to Guidelines);
see also Bradshaw, 1999 WL 1129601, at *2 (articulating pre-amendment section
51K2.13 jurisprudence). In Bradshaw, the district court considered whether a bank
robbery was effectively foreclosed from downward departure consideration in light
of the newly amended version of section 5K2.13. See id. at *24 (noting change in
section 5K2.13 language). According to the Bradshaw court, the new language had
significant effect upon downward departures for diminished capacity, leading the
court to adopt a fact-specific approach to departure inquiries. See id. at *3 (apply-
ing totality of circumstances approach to section 512.13 downward departure).
158. McFadzean, 1999 WL 1144909, at *5.
159. Id. The district court in both McFadzean and Bradshaw found the Sixth
Circuit's analysis in Allen to be instructive. See id. at *5 (noting Allen court's deci-
sion to look to particular facts and circumstances present in particular case); Brad-
shaw, 1999 WL 1129601, at *3 (same). In Allen, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged
tension between its own case law and the new amendment. See United States v.
Allen, 181 F.3d 104, No. 98-1480, 1999 WL 282674, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1999)
(noting that policy for future cases is to look to particular facts and circumstances
in individual defendant's offense for determining section 5K2.13 applicability).
160. See McFadzean, 1999 WL 1144909, at *5 (finding Seventh Circuitjurispru-
dence inconsistent with present section 5K2.13 language and application).
161. See Berman, supra note 21, at 93-94 (describing unfavorable reception of
Guidelines by judges, lawyers and scholars).
162. See generally David S. DeMatteo, Note, Welcome to Anytown, U.S.A.-Home
of Beautiful Scenery (and a Convicted Sex Offender): Sex Offender Registration and Notifica-
tion Laws in E.B. v. Verniero, 43 VILL. L. REv. 581 (1998) (discussing special dan-
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section 4B1.2 applies to section 5K2.13, the United States Sentencing
Commission successfully has advocated a return to the principles of culpa-
bility, punishment and deterrence that have been so well established by
the rich traditions of the criminal law.'163
The Commission's decision to amend the language of section 5K2.13
reaffirms those traditions.' 64 Specifically, the Commission has attempted
to reaffirm the guiding principle that defendants, whose diminished
mental and volitional capacity contributed to the commission of the in-
stant offense, are less culpable for their actions and should therefore re-
ceive the lenient, sympathetic help of society rather than the increased
sentences mandated for career offenders.1 65 Section 5K2.13, as adopted
by the Commission, has such a potential reaffirming possibility.1 66
Moreover, by indicating that a court should consider the surrounding
facts and circumstances of the offense, the Commission overtly sanctions a
return to the exercise of discretion by a sentencing judge, thus signaling a
retreat from the rigid, inflexible and unjust mandates of the Guide-
lines. 167 Although the formation of the Guidelines, in an effort to elimi-
163. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw 21-63
(1994) (discussing general principles of punishment and proportionality). For a
discussion of proportionality under the Guidelines, see Karen Lutjen, Culpability
and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The
Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'V
389, 445 (1996) (reporting that some federal circuits frequently reverse downward
departures); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Prob-
lem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRitM. L. REv. 833, 861 (1992) (noting that
downward departures are greeted with attitudes nearing hostility).
164. See Leblanc-Allman, supra note 1, at 1095 (discussing use of "guilty but
mentally ill" pleas); Nygaard, supra note 1, at 951 (discussing insanity defense in
context of individual differences); Perin & Gould, supra note 1, at 431-32 (discuss-
ing mental disability and Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
165. See generally Carlos M. Pelayo, Comment, "Give Me a Break! I Couldn't Help
Myself!"?: Rejecting Volitional Impairment as a Basis for Departure Under Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Section 5K2.13, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 729 (1999) (describing history and
application of volitional impairment for departure). But see U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1 (1998) (defining "significantly reduced
mental capacity"). According to the application note that accompanies the new
version of section 5K2.13, "'[s]ignificantly reduced mental capacity' means the de-
fendant, although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand
the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power
of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful." Id.
166. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (1998) (explicitly pro-
viding leniency to offenders suffering from "significantly reduced mental
capacity").
167. See John M. Dick, Note, Allowing Sentence Bargains to Fall Outside of the
Guidelines Without Valid Departures: It Is Time for the Commission to Act, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 1017, 1018 (1997) (noting that courts are accepting plea bargains that deviate
from mandates of Guidelines); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of
Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501, 501 (1992) (discussing Sentencing
Reform Act method of restructuring disparity among federal circuit courts); Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 246 (1989) (discussing
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nate the wide ranging sentencing disparity, was well intentioned, imposing
mandatory statutory sentences may have been an inappropriate and reac-
tionary intrusion upon the traditional function of the judiciary. 168 Char-
acterized as a dynamic relationship between judges and other law-making
bodies, the Guidelines have produced unforeseen and counterproductive
results.' 69 By amending section 5K2.13, the Commission signals a return
to the practice of allowing courts some discretion in determining when a
departure for diminished mental capacity may be warranted.' 70 Whether
substantial assistance departure under Guidelines). But see Robert G. Morvillo, Sen-
tencing Guidelines: 1997 Review, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 1998, at 3 (noting that "to the
dismay of the criminal defense bar, federal courts and prosecutors are ... increas-
ingly comfortable with harshness of Guidelines"); William W. Wilkins,Jr. &John R.
Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing
Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 74-75 (1993) (noting that conflict over dispar-
ity allows legal system to try new approaches to problem).
168. See DanielJ. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1743 (1992) (noting that
"Commission failed to devote sufficient attention to uncovering the sources of dis-
parity among judges"). Studies conducted before the Sentencing Reform Act
found distinct disparity in sentencing by judges for similar cases. See id. (discussing
initial studies). Judges indicated that the discrepancies were due to the individual-
ity of the cases and not the identity of the judges. See id. (stating that research was
insufficient to draw conclusion reached); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES
SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERA-
TION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 77 (1991) (noting that
rate of defendants pleading guilty has not changed since Guidelines' implementa-
tion); Harvey Berkman, Disparities Still Alive Under Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 15, 1997, at A10 (noting that Guidelines do not eliminate sentencing dispari-
ties); Daniel Wise, Ten Years Later, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Go Down Easier: U.S.
Commission Hobbled by Vacancies, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at I (discussing statistical
evidence of sentencing disparity). Although disparity appears to be diminishing
for upward departure under the Guidelines, clear statistical evidence exists demon-
strating significant variation among the circuits regarding downward departure.
See id. at 7 (assigning percentages to each circuit for upward and downward depar-
ture). For example, for the first time period covering October 1, 1995 through
September 30, 1996, the circuits reported the following percentages of upward
departures under the Guidelines: D.C. Circuit, 1.3; First Circuit, 0.9; Second Cir-
cuit, 0.7; Third Circuit, 0.8; Fourth Circuit, 0.7; Fifth Circuit, 1.2; Sixth Circuit, 0.8;
Seventh Circuit, 1.3; Eighth Circuit, 1.1; Ninth Circuit, 0.8; Tenth Circuit, 1.0; and
Eleventh Circuit, 1.2. See id. In contrast, significant variation in percentages exist
between the circuits for downward departure under the Guidelines: D.C. Circuit,
5.9; First Circuit, 7.3; Second Circuit, 15.2; Third Circuit, 5.3; Fourth Circuit, 3.9;
Fifth Circuit, 9.7; Sixth Circuit, 4.6; Seventh Circuit, 4.9; Eighth Circuit, 6.2; Ninth
Circuit, 21.3; Tenth Circuit, 13.6; and Eleventh Circuit, 5.7. See id.
169. See Freed, supra note 168, at 1683-85 (discussing relationship between
various law-making bodies). The Guidelines proceed on two different levels. See
id. at 1683 (discussing altered interactions). First, there is a "level of formal, visible
adherence to, or open departure from, guideline prescriptions in the trial courts,
followed by review in the courts of appeals .... " Id. Second, there is "the level of
informal noncompliance with the [Guidelines] that are eluding scrutiny by courts
of appeals and are in fact reacting to appellate rejections of reasonable departures
from unreasonable guidelines." Id. (asserting that second level is replacing first).
170. See Berman, supra note 21, at 102-04 (arguing that judges retain much
discretion in determining sentences despite rigidity of Guidelines).
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